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Introduction
Governments have become increasingly aware of international factor mobility when designing public policy. This paper examines the relationship between migration of skilled labor and public investment expenditure. The particular interest in this link stems from the empirically well-supported notion that brain drain is largely triggered by low earning prospects at home, and may further reduce income levels, whereas publicly …nanced investments may increase output capacity and therefore boost economic prosperity. Prima facie, one may therefore suspect that economies experiencing out ‡ows of skilled labor are particularly prone to invest in public infrastructure in order to mitigate or reverse brain drain.
However, a …rst look at the data reveals that public investment levels in countries which bene…t from high net immigration such as the US and Switzerland are comparatively high, whereas public investment in countries which su¤er from high net emigration like Portugal and Mexico is comparatively low. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, the change in net emigration rates of the tertiary educated between 1990 and 2000 is negatively related to the change in (log) per capita public investment levels among OECD countries. Thus, a larger migration out ‡ow is associated with slower growth of per capita public investment expenditure. 1 
<Figure 1>
To understand this empirical pattern, we develop a theoretical model with many ex ante identical jurisdictions. We examine how migration ‡ows interact with public investment levels set by benevolent policymakers. Source and host economies of high-skilled expatriates can endogenously emerge despite symmetry ex ante, which has implications for the pattern of public investment choices. There are three key features of the model. First, migration decisions are based on di¤er- 1 The relationship roughly holds when excluding English-speaking countries from the dataset. 1 ences in net wage rates for the skilled across jurisdictions. 2 The possibility of migration is taken into account when the education decision is made. Second, not only do income di¤erences trigger migration out ‡ows, but also does higher emigration raise income gaps to host economies of skilled expatriates. This is implied by assuming human capital externalities on productivity like in Lucas (1988) . Such externalities give rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria, i.e., in addition to an equilibrium without migration, there may be migration ‡ows between ex ante identical economies.
Third, we assume that higher public investments are productivity-enhancing and thus raise income per capita.
As a consequence of these basic premises and consistent with Figure 1 , it is optimal for host economies to have higher public investment levels than source economies. Interestingly, according to our model, welfare-maximization is equivalent to minimization of brain drain in a source economy. Our analysis therefore suggests that it is optimal for source economies to adjust the public investment level in order to mitigate the brain drain problem. However, it is a low rather than a high spending level, compared to host economies, which achieves this goal. In host economies it is optimal to set public investment expenditure at a level which maximizes the number of high-skilled immigrants.
In order to establish causal e¤ects in our empirical analysis, we construct an instrument for the aggregate net emigration rate of a country's skilled workers. The instrumentation strategy is motivated by the innovative way to predict of aggregate trade ‡ows in the widely cited contribution of Frankel and Romer (1999) on the e¤ects of trade on growth. We regress bilateral emigration stocks of tertiary educated workers on several presumably exogenous factors (like the distance between countries). We then use the predicted bilateral stocks to construct an aggregate net emigration rate for each country. The instrumental variable (IV) estimates tend to con…rm results 2 See Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) and Grogger and Hanson (2011) for recent empirical support.
2 from OLS estimations.
Our contribution shares several features with the previous literature. First, as in our model, Miyagiwa (1991) and Grossmann and Stadelmann (2011) allow for socially increasing returns to scale. However, these studies assume that income of the host economy is exogenous. Second, similar to seminal papers like Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) , albeit for di¤erent reasons, our framework emphasizes adverse e¤ects of outward migration. This is not to deny the possibility of potentially bene…cial wage e¤ects of emigration for source economies. However, empirically, this mechanism is supported mainly for poor countries with rather low levels of human capital Rapoport, 2001, 2008) . We instead focus on ex ante similar economies in the theoretical part and provide evidence for OECD countries. Finally, our research is related to the by now large literature on the consequences of high-skilled labor mobility on the public sector, like the implications of declining mobility costs for public education …nance under …scal competition (see e.g. Thisse, 1997, 2000; Poutvaara and Kanniainen, 2000; Andersson and Konrad, 2003; Poutvaara, 2004 Poutvaara, , 2008 Egger, Falkinger and Grossmann, 2011) . Our paper has a di¤erent focus. We develop the theoretical hypothesis that a negative relationship between highskilled emigration and productive government spending endogenously arises. This complements the literature on migration and …scal competition. For instance, Egger et al. (2011) show that governments may strategically reduce public education spending in order to mitigate a brain drain problem. 3 The testable implication is, again, that emigration has a negative e¤ect on productive government spending and we present empirical support for that hypothesis.
The Model
Consider a continuum of ex ante identical jurisdictions with unit mass. Each jurisdiction is initially populated by a unit mass of natives. There is perfect competition in goods and labor markets.
In each jurisdiction, there is a representative …rm which produces a homogenous consumption good, chosen as numeraire. Output Y is given by the linearly homogenous function F , speci…ed in CES-form:
where L is employment of low-skilled labor and X is the input of an intermediate capital good. Total factor productivity (TFP), A, depends on the number of high-skilled workers, N , in the economy. 4 We have
where a( ) is an increasing and concave function with a(0) 0. Thus, a reduction in the skilled labor force, as result of emigration, reduces output for given input levels. 5 A is taken as given by the representative …rm. Our formulation thus captures human capital externalities on productivity like in Lucas (1988) ; there are socially increasing but privately constant returns to scale.
Production of the intermediate good is skill-intensive. For simplicity it only uses high-skilled
labor. Output is given by
where S denotes the amount of high-skilled labor which is used for the production of the intermediate good and B measures its productivity. Productivity is a¤ected by the public investment level of a jurisdiction, G, measured in units of the …nal good. We assume
where b( ) is an increasing and concave function with b(0) > 0; moreover, we assume lim G!0 b 0 (G) ! 1 and lim G!1 b 0 (G) = 0. 6 According to (4) , public investment G is a local public good (i.e., there are no spillovers to other jurisdictions).
Public investment is …nanced by proportional wage taxation. The tax rate is denoted by 2 (0; 1). It applies to all workers employed in the domestic economy. 7 Individuals are endowed with one unit of time. They decide whether or not to become highskilled, at cost of e 2 (0; 1) units of time. If not spending time e in school, an individual remains low-skilled. Time not used for education is inelastically supplied to a perfect labor market. 8 Utility of individual i is given by his/her consumption level (equal to after-tax wage income) c(i) of the …nal good when working at home. If the individual works abroad, utility is a discounted measure compared to that of non-migrants; formally, utility is given by c(i)=(1 + (i)). 9 Mobility cost parameter is distributed according to a continuous p.d.f. '( ) with positive support; the corresponding c.d.f. is denoted by ( ). There are no immigration quotas. When deciding whether or not to become skilled, individuals take both migration incentives and costs into account. To focus on migration patterns of high-skilled workers, we assume that low-skilled labor is immobile. 10 We close the model description with a remark on the role of public investment, G, for economic 6 The boundary conditions ensure an interior solution for the optimal choice of G of local governments. 7 The assumption is made for concreteness. Results would be unchanged if immigrants were not be obliged to pay taxes or if emigrants still had to pay taxes at home, as will become apparent. 8 To formulate our model in a static way is for simplicity. Our main results would be unchanged if we set up an overlapping generations structure where individuals acquire education in the …rst period of life and work in the second period. 9 See Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997), among others 10 This common assuption of the brain drain literature could be justi…ed by the fact that workers with lower education levels often face severe institutional migration barriers in potential host economies. Moreover, the lowskilled may be more likely to have di¢ culties in …nding a job, learning a foreign language and integrating in the foreign society. 5 performance of a jurisdiction. What matters for the main insights of our theory is that an increase in G a¤ects labor productivity in the aggregate economy. However, rather than assuming that an increase in G raises productivity of skilled labor in the intermediate goods sector, and thus is high-skilled labor saving, one may alternatively assume that TFP A in the …nal goods sector is positively a¤ected by a higher G. It is easy to show that in this case, an increase in G would leave the educational choice una¤ected. In contrast, in our formulation public investment will generally a¤ect education decisions. Using (3) in (1) 3 Equilibrium Analysis
Small Open Economy
We …rst analyze the education and migration decision in a single jurisdiction for a given public investment level and given the income opportunities abroad (small open economy).
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, for a given number of (skilled) emigrants, m, the wage rate of skilled labor is given by
Proof. See online appendix (www.unifr.ch/makro).
Hence,w S (B; m) is increasing and strictly concave as a function of B under assumption A1 (w S B > 0,w S BB < 0). 11 Moreover, > 1 is su¢ cient (but not necessary) for the cross-derivative ofw S to be negative (w S Bm < 0). This will turn out to be a key property of the model. It may be understood as follows: Due to human capital externalities, higher emigration lowers TFP and therefore reduces wage rates; in particular,w S m < 0. The decline in TFP lowers the marginal product of the intermediate good in …nal goods production; thus, an increase in the productivity of skilled labor B has a lower impact on wage rates if m increases. As B is positively a¤ected by a higher public investment level G, this implies that an increase in G has a lower impact on wage rates, if more skilled workers emigrate.
We now turn to the migration decision. Let the highest net wage rate per unit of high-skilled labor among jurisdictions abroad be given by w S net . For the purpose of this subsection, we treat w S net as exogenous whereas in an international equilibrium analyzed below, wages everywhere are a¤ected by migration ‡ows.
Due to of disutility from emigrating for given consumption, individual i emigrates if
where w S net (1 )w S is the after-tax wage rate of skilled labor in the considered economy. Thus,
From the government budget constraint, [w S (1 e)N + w L L] = G. Employing no arbitrage 11 2 is su¢ cient but not necessary for strict concavity. 7 condition (1 e)w S = w L and resource constraint N + L = 1 m, we …nd that w S = G (1 m)(1 e) .
Thus, we have
From the properties of (5) and function b, the net wage rate w S net = W (G; m) is decreasing in the number of emigrants m, for two reasons. The …rst reason is that an increase in m lowers TFP, as discussed above. The second reason is that higher emigration reduces the tax base, which means that for a given public investment level G, the tax rate has to increase in order to balance the government budget. Both e¤ects go in the same direction. If we alternatively assumed that emigrants still pay taxes where they are born, such that the second e¤ects would vanish, W m < 0 would still hold.
There are two further interesting properties of function W , which give rise to our main results, as will become apparent. First, under assumption A1, after-tax wages are strictly concave as a function of G, W GG < 0. 12 Second, the e¤ect of an increase in G on wages is smaller, if emigration is higher; formally, W Gm < 0. The property also arises for two reasons: First, as discussed, pretax wage rates are rising less as a response of an increase in productivity parameter B when m increases (recallw S Bm < 0). Moreover, it holds that the additional tax burden of an increase in G is higher, if emigration rises. Again the second e¤ect would vanish if emigrants still paid taxes in the economy where they are born. According to (7) , if w S net W (G; m), the number of emigrants m 0 is implicitly given by 12 Recall thatw S BB < 0 and b 00 0. Figure 2 depicts the right-hand side, RHS, of (9), as a (S-shaped) function of m (given w S net and G). An equilibrium is reached if RHS intersects with the 45-degree line. Figure 2 shows three equilibria, with migration levels denoted by m 0 , m'and m 1 . Multiple equilibria easily arise due to the following interaction: on the one hand, (after-tax) income di¤erences trigger migration ‡ows. On the other hand, higher emigration triggers income reductions in the source economy, due to negative human capital externalities of brain drain; this gives further incentives to emigrate.
Consequently, either emigration and the wage gap to the exogenous level w S net are high or both are low. Figure 2 is drawn in such a way that at m 0 = 0 (no emigration or immigration in the considered economy) the net wage rate is the same as the highest one abroad, W (G; 0) = w S net .
The two other equilibria in Figure 2 , m'and m 1 , feature emigration.
<Figure 2>
Throughout, we invoke the standard notion of tâtonnement stability; here, this means that we focus on migration levels where small perturbations of an equilibrium gives rise to a tendency of m to return to its initial level. In Figure 2 , this is the case when RHS crosses the 45-degree line from above (i.e., @RHS=@m < 1). Thus, m 0 = 0 and m 1 are stable equilibrium migration levels, whereas at m'the equilibrium is unstable. Suppose, e.g., that the number of emigrants m would be slightly below m 1 . In this case, RHS > m, implying that emigration tends to rise. If to the contrary the number of emigrants m is slightly higher than m 1 , then RHS < m and the number of migrants tends to fall. The opposite holds at m'.
International Equilibrium
We now turn to the international equilibrium, where all income levels are endogenous. Such an equilibrium could be analyzed for any given distribution of (local) public investment levels in the world economy. We focus on the particular case where all jurisdictions choose their public investment levels "optimally". 13 As we are interested in the relationship between public investment and the pattern of migration, we need a plausible government objective function. In our context, with ex ante identical individuals, a plausible candidate is the utility of non-migrating individuals.
These most plausibly represent the median voter. For a jurisdiction which does not expect to have immigration, m 0, this means that net wage rate W (G; m) is maximized subject to the education and migration decisions as re ‡ected by (9) . The after-tax wage rates abroad are taken as given. 14 So far we focused on emigration. Regarding immigration, suppose a jurisdiction expecting an in ‡ow of skilled workers takes into account that the number of immigrants, I, depends on the domestic net wage rate of high-skilled labor and the income opportunities of high-skilled labor abroad. Formally, suppose host economies with I > 0 immigrants take into account schedule I =Ĩ(w S net ), withĨ 0 > 0 (i.e., higher after-tax wage rates at home makes host economies more attractive). 15 Analogously to the derivation of (8) higher immigration has positive productivity e¤ects; formally, we have w S net = W (G; I). Thus,
implicitly de…nes the immigration level I as a function of G; we denote this level by I =Î(G).
Fortunately, as will become apparent, we do not have to know functionsĨ orÎ to characterize an international (perfect foresight) equilibrium. We require the following equilibrium conditions to hold: 13 Although this may not literally be the case, focussing on optimal choices is meaningful to explain empirical evidence if the basic economic trade-o¤s faced by governments, which we identify here, are taken into account in real life. 14 Note that there is no strategic interaction in choosing public investment levels as each jurisdiction is in…nitesimally small. 15 The immigration level also depends on income opportunities abroad, which are suppressed in the formal representation.
Individuals optimally choose whether to acquire education and whether to migrate if educated, by taking wage rates at home and abroad as given.
Representative …rms in both the …nal goods sector and the intermediate goods sector maximize pro…ts by taking factor prices as given.
In all jurisdictions, public investment levels are chosen such that net wage rates of the nonmigrants are maximized, taking into account educational choices, migration behavior, choices of …rms, and taking as given wage rates abroad.
Migration patterns are tâtonnement-stable.
The number of immigrants in the world equals the number of emigrants.
We will now show that, despite symmetry of jurisdictions ex ante, there may exist an equilibrium where there is a group of host economies which have the same immigration level I and a group of source economies which have the same emigration level m. Denoting the fraction of host economies by , we then have
What agents take as given must of course be correct ex post. For governments, this includes the expectation whether to be a host or source economy of migrating workers. Expecting m = 0, a jurisdiction solves max G W (G; 0). As W GG < 0, this leads to optimal public investment level G 0 as given by W G (G 0 ; 0) = 0. Moreover, expecting m > 0, a jurisdiction solves max G W (G;m(G)),
wherem denotes the level of emigration which is implicitly given by (9) . 16 The …rst-order condition reads W G + W mmG = 0:
Applying the implicit function theorem to (9) implies that
Thus, under stability (@RHS=@m < 1), the …rst order condition (12) can be rewritten as W G (G;m(G)) = 0. At the so-de…ned public investment level, we havem G = 0, according to (13) . Thus, W GG < 0 is su¢ cient for the second-order condition to hold. Finally, expecting I =Î(G) > 0, a jurisdiction solves max G W (G; Î (G)). 17 The …rst-order condition reads
where the implicit function theorem implies that
Under stability, analogously to (13) , the denominator of the right-hand side of (15) is positive.
Thus, the …rst order condition (14) for a source economy becomes W G (G; Î (G)) = 0. Again, the second order condition holds.
It is interesting to note that, at the optimal public investment levels, emigration is minimized in a source economy of high-skilled expatriates and immigration is maximized in host economies.
To see this formally, note thatm G = 0 if and only if W G = 0 for source economies. At the so-de…ned level of G,m GG > 0, according to (13) . Similarly,Î G = 0 if W G = 0 andÎ GG < 0 at that level of G. These results are implied by the basic properties of the model. Recall that the government objective is to maximize net wage income of workers at home. Income opportunities 17 Recall thatÎ is the level of immigration which is implicitly given by (10).
12
abroad relative to those at home form the basis for migration decisions. Both skilled workers and the government take net wage rates abroad as given. The government problem and individual migration decisions are thus based on the same variable, the wage rate for skilled labor at home, w S net . The question now is in which way the migration of skilled labor a¤ects public investment levels. 18 In equilibrium, the expectation whether to be host or source economy is self-ful…lling. Any fraction of host economies is a potential equilibrium value. For concreteness, we focus on = 0:5. 19 According to (11) , this implies I = m. Let us denote by G 1 and G 2 the equilibrium public investment level of a source economy and host economy, respectively.
Proposition 2.
In international equilibrium, the number of migrants in or out of a jurisdiction, m 0, and investment levels (G 1 ; G 2 ) are simultaneously given by equation system
Let us write public investment levels de…ned by W G (G; m) = 0 and W G (G; m) = 0 asG 1 (m) andG 2 (m), respectively, and de…ne
Thus, equilibrium migration is given by m = M (m ). As follows from the notion of stability of 18 According to our theory, if governments are maximizing, regressing the emigration rate on productive public expenditure would reveal zero e¤ect. Thus, in theory, there is no reverse causality bias. We nevertheless employ an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the impact of emigration on public expenditure. 19 The choice of does not a¤ect the insights of the following analysis.
13 equilibrium emigration, we must have that M 0 (m ) < 1 for m 0. Note that M (0) = M 0 (0) = 0.
Property M 0 (0) < 1 ensures that there exists a symmetric international equilibrium, in which there is no migration (m = 0) and all jurisdictions choose public investment level G 0 as de…ned by W G (G 0 ; 0) = 0. Moreover, there may be an asymmetric equilibrium with m > 0 (like m 1 in Figure 2 ), such that (16)- (18) and M 0 (m ) < 1 holds. The key characteristic of this equilibrium is that G 1 < G 2 ; that is, source economies have a lower public investment level than host economies.
This important result follows from property W Gm < 0 and the de…nition ofG 1 (m) andG 2 (m),
Because the marginal impact of increasing the public investment level on the utility of non-migrants decreases with higher brain drain and increases when more skilled workers immigrate, the analysis suggests a negative relationship between net emigration of an economy and its public investment level.
Empirical Support
The theoretical analysis suggests three main hypotheses. First, emigration incentives depend on relative income to potential destination economies. The prediction that income di¤erences trigger migration ‡ows has been examined empirically elsewhere. Recently, both Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) and Grogger and Hanson (2011) provide convincing evidence for the critical role of wage di¤erences between country pairs on emigration rates of tertiary educated workers.
Second, our increasing returns framework suggests that there is a feedback mechanism working from higher emigration to lower wage rates and income levels. Based on an alternative theoretical framework in Grossmann and Stadelmann (2011) , this prediction is supported by evidence provided in Grossmann and Stadelmann (2010) . Third, and most important for the purpose of this study, we have highlighted the interaction between emigration of high-skilled labor and an economy's public investment level. We have shown that the marginal impact of an increase in public investments on income of domestic workers decreases with higher emigration. The novel hypothesis we explore thus is that a higher net emigration rate of high-skilled workers in an economy causes lower public investment levels, all other things equal. We test this prediction with OECD data.
Examining the correlation between public expenditure and emigration cannot identify the direction of causation between the two. We therefore construct an instrument for net migration rates of skilled workers and provide instrumental-variable (IV) estimations in addition to OLS. For this we use a measure of social networks of migrants and exogenous country characteristics, both potentially a¤ecting mobility costs of individuals, to explain bilateral migration ‡ows.
Data and Estimation Strategy
The …rst challenge is to …nd a measure for the net emigration rate of high-skilled individuals for OECD countries. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) have established a dataset of (gross) emigration stocks and rates by educational attainment for the years 1990 and 2000. The authors count as emigrants all foreign-born individuals aged at least 25 who live in an OECD country and class them by educational attainment and country of origin. Thus, only emigration into OECD countries is captured, approximately 90 % of educated migrants in the world. 20 Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) extend the initial dataset by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and provide bilateral emigration stocks of high-skilled persons from country i living in OECD country j, denoted by M ij . Furthermore, let S All denote the set of countries in the data set (each one is a potential source country) and denote by S OECD the set of OECD countries (only these are potential host countries).
We construct the net emigration stock of an OECD country j by aggregating its total emigration stock, P i2S OECD M ji , and deducting its total immigration stock, P 
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of OECD country j is denoted by N etEmig j := P i2S OECD M ji P i2S All M ij :To adjust the emigration variable for the size of the skilled labor force, we divide the high-skilled net emigration stock by the stock of skilled residents in country j, N j , and thereby obtain a net emigration rate:
Denoting by G j the public investment level per capita of country j we estimate the following equation for the year 2000:
As the theoretical model predicts a negative impact of higher emigration on public investment, we expect 1 < 0. x j is a vector of other controls potentially a¤ecting public investment in country j. We include (log) population size in order to control for economies of scale associated with public goods. That is, if anything, population size should be negatively related to public expenditure per capita. Moreover, to account for the age structure of a country, which may a¤ect public investments, we include the fraction of population under the age of 16. Finally, to deal with spending determinants which are not based on the optimality criterion employed in the theoretical model, we also control for social spending per capita. Thereby we want, on the one hand, account for the possibility that governments'spending levels on both investment and noninvestment expenditure categories are higher in some countries than in others for ideological or cultural reasons. This would suggest a positive relationship between government investment and social spending. On the other hand, governments may substitute public investments for welfare expenses. This would imply a negative relationship between the two spending categories. " j is an error term.
We use four di¤erent measures of public expenditure as dependent variable: government gross …xed capital formation, total publicly …nanced R&D spending, R&D spending on higher education, and total public education expenditure (all in logs). The …rst category may be most suited in light of the theoretical model, as it represents public infrastructure spending. We focus on the e¤ects of this category …rst and discuss the other measures which have qualitatively the same results in an online appendix.
To mitigate potential omitted variable bias, we also take …rst di¤erences of equation (20) and regress the (approximate) growth rate of public investment per capita in country j on the change in the emigration rate of skilled migrants between 1990 and 2000: ties and common language as potential determinants of are also typically used in the brain drain literature. The region dummy is supposed to further capture cultural factors which could be related to language groups (Arabic language group, Slavic language group etc.) and are not necessarily captured by common language. For example, it might be easier for Germans than for Russians to migrate to the UK due to lower cultural barriers between German and English speaking countries.
The dummy may also capture historical ties (other than colonial ties) of countries. The dummy on transition countries is potentially important as well, since the time period we consider was shortly after the fall of the iron curtain. This event has newly created the possibility to emigrate from a former communist country to non-transition countries.
The following equation presents the estimated value of bilateral migration stocks with 3515
In speci…cations (1) to (4) the coe¢ cient of interest, 1 , is always negative. In column (1), we look at the e¤ect of the net emigration rate (M ig) on public investment in 22 OECD countries using OLS without any controls. Column (2) uses instead the constructed net emigration rate ( d M ig) as an instrument for the actual net emigration rate. The results provide no evidence that ordinary least-squares estimates overstate the negative e¤ect on public investment. The two coe¢ cients in column (1) and column (2) roughly have the same size. Standard errors are quite high, however,
given the limited number of observations. The instrument itself proves to be highly signi…cant when considering the …rst stage F-Test. Columns (3) and (4) An increase in the di¤erence of the net emigration rate between 1990 and 2000 has a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of the public investment level per capita. According to columns (5) to (10) in Table 1 , 1 is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero below the 5 percent level, except for the IV regression in column (8) , with signi…cance being between the 5 and 10 percent level. Again, OLSand IV-estimates are in the same range. As expected, also the growth rate of GDP per capita (6), (8) and (10) of Table 1 , the F-Test shows that the …rst stage is always signi…cant with the proposed instrument.
Conclusion
We analyzed theoretically and empirically the relationship between migration of high-skilled individuals, income di¤erences, and di¤erences in public investment levels across jurisdictions. According to the theoretical model, migration of skilled labor may endogenously arise despite symmetry of jurisdictions ex ante. This possibility arises from the assumption of human capital externalities, which imply that out ‡ows of skilled labor reduce wage rates in source economies whereas in ‡ows raise them in destination economies. Most importantly, the analysis suggests that higher outward migration reduces the impact of an increase in productivity-enhancing public expenditure on both gross and net income levels of workers, whereas higher inward migration increases it. Consequently, governments who care about welfare of the domestic labor force adjust public investment levels downward when facing brain drain and upward when experiencing in ‡ows of skilled labor.
We presented empirical evidence which is consistent with this main prediction of the theory.
The innovation in the empirical part was to construct and employ an instrument for the net emigration rate of a country in order to establish a causal e¤ect. We showed that an increase in the predicted net emigration rate causes quite substantial reductions of public investment levels per capita. Consequently, our analysis suggests that more pronounced international migration patterns for skilled labor are likely to aggravate di¤erences in public investment levels across countries, along with income di¤erences. Notes: *** indicates a significance level below 5 percent; ** indicates significance level between 5 and 10 percent; * indicates significance level between 10 and 15 percent. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
21

PubInv DeltaPubInv
